Cognitive traps in individual and organizational behavior: some empirical evidence by Bonini, Nicolao & Egidi, Massimo
1&RJQLWLYHWUDSVLQLQGLYLGXDODQGRUJDQL]DWLRQDOEHKDYLRUVRPHHPSLULFDO
HYLGHQFH
Nicolao Bonini and Massimo Egidi
°Institute of Psychology, Cagliari University and Princeton University
*CEEL ,Trento University
,QWURGXFWLRQ
%DUUDFXGDVDURXQGWKH5HHI
"How they do it? The question occurs naturally to anyone watching a school of
silversides moving slowly over a reef in clear tropical waters. Hundreds of small fish
glide in unison , more like a single organism than a collection of individuals. The school
idles along a straight course, then wheels suddendly; not a single fish is lost from the
group. A barracuda darts from behind an outcropping of coral , and the members of the
school flash outward in an expanding sphere. The flash expansion dissolves the school
in a fraction of a second, yet none of the fish collide. Moments later the scattered
individuals collect in  small groups; ultimately the school re-forms and continues to
feed, lacking perhaps a member or two" (Partridge 1982).
This vivid description of the reaction to the barracuda’s attack contains all ingredients
that characterize what we can call a  URXWLQL]HGJURXSEHKDYLRU :
1    5HSHDWHGDFWLRQV: many individuals act as if they were mechanically executing a
list of instructions. When the same environmental conditions appear (the barracuda's
attack), the school will react by exhibiting the same sequence of behaviors. Therefore an
external observer would describe this collective behavior as "routinized", because he
observes that the same set of actions is performed in response to the same conditions.
2 &RQGLWLRQDFWLRQUXOHVGHWHUPLQHWKHURXWLQHH[HFXWLRQ: “Most  species of fish have
a prominent lateral line on each side of the body. The displacement-sensitive
receptors that make up the line provide information that helps a fish to maintain its
position in a school”.  When a barracuda triggers the attack, the global reaction
observed is the flash: each member of the school reacts maintaining distance from
and angle to the nearest neighbor DVLI  he would be executing a plan.
3 'LVWULEXWHGFRRUGLQDWLQJGHYLFHV: “Does a school have a leader?”  The fish school
shows a perfect degree of coordination, - never a collision is observed - and
therefore the puzzling question is how this can happen without a central authority
which coordinates the collective action. Partridge  results suggest that vision
provides the most important information for maintaining distance from and angle
to the nearest neighbor, while the lateral line appears to be the most important for
determining the neighbor's speed and direction. Vision and lateral lines provides
distributed information which allow the school to perfectly coordinate actions.
Therefore a relatively low number of parameters guide the action of the individuals
in the school, and generate the patterns of collective behaviors. The evidence shows
2that the  behavioral rules regulating the action are  simple and distributed :
decentralized.
4 7KH YDULHW\ DQG VXERSWLPDOLW\ RI HVFDSH SDWWHUQV DQG WKH VHOHFWLYH SUHVVXUH
HIIHFWV: The flash is the immediate reaction of the school to an attack of a predator.
This reaction  confuses the predator and strongly reduces his chances of success: a
predator facing a large number of preys has difficulties to focus his attention
toward a specific prey. “The mechanism of sensory confusion and possibly that of
indecision seems to be responsible for the predator's dilemma ..... there is
substantial evidence that schools confuse predators” (ibidem).
Does therefore an optimal escape pattern exist and is the flash-sphere pattern? We
should expect that the answer to this question is yes, but other evidence shows that there
are other types of strategies to reduce the chances of success of a predator.  “School of
fish engage in several dramatic evasive maneuvers. The tactic adopted depends in part
on how rapidly the predator is approaching” (p. 93). Many fish schools exhibit very
complicated orbits which give the impression of a "random cloud" : they once again
confuse the predator, that during the attack has a changing and imprecise information on
the position of the school .
Therefore at least two different strategies exist to reduce the success of an attack, and
their optimality seems to depend upon the distance and the relative speed between the
predator and the fish school: the  “random cloud”  seems to be the most efficient
protection when the barracuda’s attack starts far from the school, while the “sphere
flash” behavior is probably the best reaction to close attacks.
It is very natural to consider the properties of fish schools as a metaphor for analyzing
human routinized behavioral patterns in cooperative contexts. We need not to
emphasize, in fact,  that the four features of school fishes focused above (repetitiveness,
automatic triggering of the action, distributed coordination, sub-optimality) exhibit
strict similarities with the properties of  routinized behaviors in the context of teams of
human beings. (Cohen,  Burkhart, Dosi, Egidi, Marengo, Warglien, Winter, 1996) .
The similarities between the automatic reactions of fish schools and the routinized
behaviors in human groups help us to focus on dissimilarities and to clarify the
properties which are specific of human behaviors in organizational contexts : in our
view, the most relevant question in this regard is to understand what “degree of
individual intelligence” is required to guarantee the emergence and the efficiency of
routinized patterns of collective behaviors .
In organizational contexts in fact a large part of human knowledge is tacit, and
therefore it is not clear what may be the role and the limits of explicit planning activity.
Put in slightly different terms, the rise of a routinized pattern of behavior is a emergent
process, which may go largely beyond the explicit willing and plans of human beings
involved. It is therefore meaningful to explore the limits of human capacity to plan and
more generally to use correctly the reason to pursue their goals, in a context in which
they are not fully aware of  the reciprocal relationships.
A first question in this regard is the relation between the routinization as organizational
process and the routinization as individual mental process.  The problem is to
understand LI the automaticity with which human teams repeat the same sequences of
actions can be explained in terms of automaticity in their mental processes.  Studies on
the mechanization of thinking - the so-called "Einstellung effect" (Luchins 1942, 1950)
have suggested that routinized behaviors are based on “URXWLQL]HGWKLQNLQJ”, i.e. on the
3automatic use of "chunks" which enable individuals to save on mental effort (Weisberg
1980, Simon and Newell 1972, Newell 1990).
Following this tradition, we can explore if behind routinized team behaviors there are
particular features in terms of individual mental models (in the sense clarified by
Johnson Laird (1983)): the question to be clarified is if the individuals belonging to a
team which exhibits repetitive (routinized) behavior, are “mentally routinized”; i.e., if
they follow set of rules sedimented in the long term memory which enable them to make
their actions in a coordinated way  and with a reduced mental effort. In other words, we
will explore if  routinized team behaviors can be considered as the outcome of
routinized thinking.
A second  aspect of the problem, strictly related to the former, is that of “cognitive
traps”, raised by March and Levinthal (Levinthal and March 1988 1993). They suggest
that organizations, during the adjustment to changing external conditions may be
trapped in configuration which are locally optimal only in the short run. Organizations
may not be able to jump out of the trap and reorganize themselves in a more efficient
way when the external conditions change. The two patterns of routinized behaviors
exhibited by fishes schools, “flash sphere” and “random clouds” provide here a
simplified but vivid example of this kind of situations. In our context it becomes
important to understand if an organizational trap is based on an individual cognitive
trap, i.e. the inability of human beings to mentally explore new strategies of action,
beyond the well known and familiar strategies that they use normally.
 We will analyze these problems in the context of a game,  7DUJHW 7KH 7ZR , (TTT)
created by Cohen and Bacdayan to explore the coordination properties of team actions,
by presenting and discussing the result of three experiments with TTT carried out at the
CEEL (Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory ) of the University of
Trento. Data related to the experiments and all other relevant information are available
on the Web, at the address http://www-ceel.gelso.unitn.it/.
Before describing and commenting the experiments with TTT we start with a short
survey of the issues in the domain of team decision which are relevant in relation to our
problem; to better frame the problem, we will compare and collect the approaches
emerging from the economic literature and these emerging from psychology.
7HDPDQG*URXS'HFLVLRQ
The taking of decisions and the implementing of plans of action often involve the
coordinated and interdependent activity of a group of people belonging to a ‘team’.
Consider, for instance, the crew of an aircraft, the staff of  a hospital operating theatre, a
military command and control unit. Some authors, indeed, argue that the team is one of
the crucial components of modern American industry, in both the public and military
sectors (Cummings, 1981; Hackman and Morris, 1975; Sundstrom, DeMeuse and
Futrell, 1990).
   Although in the past several scholars have used the terms ‘group’ and ‘team’ as
synonymous, more recently there has been a tendency to distinguish team decision-
making from group decision-making (see Cannon-Bowers, Salas and Converse, 1993;
Dyer, 1984; Morgan, Glickman, Woodard, Blaiwes and Salas, 1986; Orasanu and Salas,
41993). Cooperation, reciprocal adaptability and the shared belief in common goals are
the most important requirement for a team. There are other characteristics of the team
that distinguish WHDP GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ from group decision-making: notably, the
differentiation among members according to their roles and the knowledge required to
perform tasks, and their interdependence. Teams are usually made up of highly diverse
and interdependent individuals, while groups consist of similar and interchangeable
individuals - juries being a case in point. Unlike the members of a team, therefore, those
of a group are usually homogeneous in terms of the knowledge and the skills required to
perform the task, and of their roles and assumption of responsibility (Orasanu and Salas,
1993).
   The features that distinguish the team from the group are also reflected in the tasks
that a team normally undertakes. The salient feature of these tasks is that they require
the participation of a certain number of closely coordinated experts. In some cases, they
require tight coordination among the actions of the team members, in driving a tank for
example, or in a surgical operation, or in the operations of a military command unit. In
other cases, the task could in theory be accomplished by an individual, but they are
handled by a team because they are so complex that no single individual possesses the
expertise needed to accomplish them. Consider, for example, the decision whether or
not to build a nuclear power station.
   Study of WHDPGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ and analysis of the often disastrous consequences of
unsuccessful teamwork has highlighted the role of  so-called behavioral variables. To
take aviation as an example, it has been reported that more that 70% of serious air
accidents between 1959 and 1989 were at least partly due to the behavior of the flight
crew  (Guzzo and Dickson, 1996). Some authors maintain that at least 50% of these
errors were decision-making and coordination errors committed by the crew (Foushee
and Hemreich, 1988 cit. in Duffy, 1993; Diehl, 1991 cit. in Guzzo and Dickson, 1996).
Moreover, in a comparative study of civil and military aviation, Prince and Salas (1993)
have pointed out notable similarities between accidents in the two sectors. And they
stress that the principal errors involved information exchange in the cockpit, the
distribution and specification of levels of task priority, and relations among crew
members.
   Study of behavioral variables in WHDP GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ as regards both the armed
forces (for example, command and control units) and aircrews has yielded a number of
behavioral categories (Glickman, Zimmer, Montero, Guerette, Campbell, Morgan and
Salas, 1987; Oser, McCallum, Salas and Morgan, 1989, Stout, Cannon-Bowers, Salas
and Morgan cit. in Cannon-Bowers, Salars and Converse, 1993). For example,
Glickman et al. (1987) have reported two types of behavior which tend to emerge and
diverge during the training of a team.
   On the one hand, there is the behavior of an individual who has to perform a task.
Consider, for example, the actions required for the correct execution of a procedure or to
use a tool or an item of equipment supplied to the members of a team. On the other,
there is the behavior that places an individual in relation with the other members of the
team: for example, communication among its members, the adjustment of one’s own
behavior to that of the others, reciprocal monitoring of actions, the management and
control of information exchange, and so on.
5   Although numerous activities fall within the second category of behavior, this article
will focus mainly on the flexibility of team action and the coordination of team-
members’ decisions and actions, for the reasons we have discussed in the introduction.
As we shall later see in more detail, flexibility of  action and the coordination of
behavior is an important factor in the success of a team. For example, as regards
coordination, McIntyre, Morgan, Salas and Glickman (1988 cit. in Cannon-Bowers,
Salas and Converse, 1993) have shown that the members of an efficient team are
particularly adept at predicting the behavior and needs of their colleagues. Kleinman,
Luh, Pattipati and Serfaty (1992) have reported that, in conditions of work overload (i.e.
when there is little opportunity for overt verbal communication), the efficient team is
able to keep its performance up to standard by relying mainly on implicit cooperation
strategies.
   The study of  the coordination of decisions and teamwork, and of their flexibility, is a
rather complex undertaking. This is because these activities involve the ability of the
team-members to predict the needs that arise in the execution of a particular task, and to
anticipate the actions of other members so that they may adjust their actions
accordingly. Moreover, efficient coordination requires team-members to distinguish
between the actions entailed by the characteristics of the specific task at hand from those
that depend on the characteristics, duties and needs of their colleagues (Prince,
Chidester, Bowers and Cannon-Bowers, 1992).
   Research of this kind therefore requires construction of theoretical models and a
research design suited to study of the activities of groups of individuals in structured and
dynamic decision-making contexts. As we shall see in the next section, few models and
methodologies have been developed for analysis of the cognitive aspects of WHDP
GHFLVLRQPDNLQJ and, especially, of coordination among the members of a team.
7HDPGHFLVLRQVUHVHDUFKPRGHOVDQGPHWKRGV
If one excludes research on groups conducted by social psychologists in the last fifty
years, research on WHDPGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ is very recent. It is based principally on studies
seeking to describe the actions, decisions and communications that take place in a team
performing complex tasks in natural environments (Orasanu and Salas, 1993).
   Although several theoretical and empirical studies have been produced in recent years,
relatively little is known about the nature of team decisions and actions, or about the
best type of training for activities of this kind (Hackman, 1987; Salas, Dickson,
Converse and Tannenbaum, 1992). In particular, the specific skills characteristic of the
decision-making activity of a an efficient team, and the processes involved in the
acquisition, maintenance and loss of those critical skills, have been little studied (Dyer,
1984). However, in recent years, empirical and theoretical research in this sector has
produced two WHDPGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ approaches: the approach of shared mental models,
and that of the team mind. Although in both cases it is more appropriate to talk of
approaches rather than full-fledged theories, they take account of a certain number of
phenomena evident in team behavior, and they provide both a conceptual framework for
use in analysis of team decision-making and useful indications for future research.
67KHDSSURDFKRIVKDUHGPHQWDOPRGHOV
   According to this approach, coordination among the actions of the members of a team,
and their adaptability to new situations, depend on their ability to share mental models
relative to the situation at hand.
   Mental models can be defined as organized patterns of knowledge relative to aspects
of the situation or problem or task to be dealt with; aspects such as, for example, the
skills required to accomplish a task, the features of the procedures implemented to do
so, the roles, functions and responsibilities attaching to the various members of the
team, and so on.
   Some of this shared knowledge derives from the membership of a team or a cultural
group; some of it derives from membership of an even more specific group - an
occupational category for example; and some of it relates to the specific situation
addressed by the team. For example, an aircrew is aware of the physical principles
which enable an aircraft to fly, and they know how the systems used in their aircraft
work. This knowledge facilitates communication among the crew members concerning
these systems, and it provides precise terms of reference. Moreover, the crew members
are familiar with standard operational procedures and the specific policies of their
airline. Finally, they know the rules of behavior and the roles of each member of their
team (Cannon-Bowers and Salas, 1990 cit. in Orasanu and Salas, 1993).
   It is this sharing of mental models that  enables each member of a team to synchronize
his functions with the actions and decisions of his colleagues. In other words, the
sharing of mental models enables a team to function as a unit without it being necessary
to negotiate or discuss what to do and when to do it. Orasanu and Salas (1993) stress
that the functioning of a team in both routine circumstances and emergencies depends
on this process of knowledge-sharing. In new or emergency conditions, the team-
members develop shared mental models of the situation to be dealt with. This
elaboration is based on shared general knowledge, and it enables the team to coordinate
itself when there is insufficient time to develop explicit strategies of action, or when it is
difficult to communicate verbally.
   According to the approach of shared mental models, the processes whereby  the
members of team are able to coordinate themselves and adapt to new situations are of
substantially two kinds.
   On one hand, a crucial role is played by reciprocal and precise expectations
concerning various aspects of the situation. It is on the basis of these expectations that
each member of the team coordinates his decisions and actions with those of  the other
members, and that forms of implicit coordination become possible (Cream, Eggemeier
and Klein, 1978; Gabarro, 1990; Orasanu and Salas, 1993; Vreuls and Obermayer,
1985).
   On the other hand an important role is played by the development of shared
explanations for events associated with the team’s work or the tasks it must perform. It
is on the basis of these explanations that the team-members  are able to develop shared
expectations concerning their task and to coordinate their action (Rouse and Morris,
1986). Of course, both processes are made possible by the sharing by the team-members
of a mental model of the situation.
7   Only a few researchers, however, have attempted to test the shared mental models
theory empirically (see Adelman, Zirk, Lehner, Moffett and Hall, 1986; Brehmer, 1972),
and their findings have been criticized from various points of view (for example, the
members of the team had received insufficient training for them to develop shared
mental models). Nevertheless, indirect evidence is forthcoming of the importance of
shared knowledge and precise expectations among the members of a team in
determining the efficiency of their performance.
   Hammond (1965) has shown that the members of teams which fail to solve problems
efficiently employ information in a different manner. Such diverse information use,
according to Hammond, stems from the diverse nature of the mental models of the task
developed by the team members. This is a  view is shared by Wohl, Entin, Kleinman
and Pattipati (1984) who, in a survey of military control and command decisions,
maintain that an efficient military team must have a shared mental model of the
functions of each of its members. Finally, in a study of WHDP GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ by
aircrews in emergency situations, Orasanu (1990 cit. in Cannon-Bowers, Salas and
Converse, 1993) reports that the forms of communication employed by the members of
efficient teams are different from those used by inefficient ones. The former type of
crew tends to be more explicit in its definition of the problem; it is better able to
formulate plans and strategies to deal with the emergency; it searches for relevant
information; and it allocates responsibilities among its members less ambiguously.
Orasanu attributes the differences between the modes of communication employed by
the two types of team to the fact that they have different mental models of the situation.
In particular, she argues, more efficient teams are more efficient at sharing the
knowledge relative to the emergency situation to be confronted.
7KHDSSURDFKRIWKHJURXSPLQG
According to this approach, a team is an information-processing unit (Duffy, 1993;
Lord, 1985; Wegner, 1987; Klein and Thordsen, 1989). Consequently, the decision
taken by a team is nothing but the last step in a sequence of  information-processing
phases. Usually, these phases replicate the various stages revealed by cognitive
psychology in decision-making by individuals (Hogarth, 1987; Bonin and Rumiati,
1991). For example, Duffy (1993) distinguishes many phases or stages in which
information is subjected to changes or to filtering activities: attention, codification,
storing, retrieval and so on.
   Just as an individual, according to the theory of man as an information processor,
displays systematic biases when processing information, so too does a team. This does
not necessarily mean that all the biases identified in individual decision-making activity
are present in WHDP GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ. For example, the difficulties arising from the
limited short-term memory of  an individual can be overcome by the ‘transactive
memory’ or the collective memory (Wegner, 1987). Nevertheless, some authors, citing
indirect evidence, contend that certain features of individual information-processing are
reflected in patterns of group information-processing.
   Klein and Thordsen (1989 cit. in Orasanu and Salas, 1993) have pointed out that
certain teams of experts (for example, military command and control units, emergency
services, fire brigades, aircrews) use certain decision-making strategies which can be
8detected also in the decision-making activities of members of the team when they take
decisions as individuals. According to Klein (1993), both WHDP GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ and
individual decision-making are characterized by a process of  ‘recognition-primed
decision making’.
   According to this model of decision-making, rather than generating and analytically
assessing all the options available in order to choose the best of them,  individuals and
teams draw on their past experience in order to verify whether the situation at hand
belongs to a given category of situations. The most viable decision/action is selected on
the basis of this categorization, and it may be further evaluated by means of  mental
simulation of the consequences deriving from its application. If the outcome of this
simulation test is positive, the decision or action is taken or implemented. If  it  is
negative, then a different decision/action is sought, or else the entire situation is
assessed anew. Note that the team’s eschewing of a classic analytical model of decision-
making is, in certain respects, surprising because the limitations of memory or
computational capacity typical of an individual can easily be overcome by a team.
   Other results in support of the hypothesis that there is a close similarity between
individual and group decision-making activity have been provided by analysis of
learning in organizations (Levinthal and March, 1993).
   Levinthal and March’s study identifies a set of ‘myopias’ and ‘traps’ into which an
organization may fall. These traps arise from the characteristics of organizational
learning processes. The two authors show, for example, that an organization tends to
give priority to the short-term perspective over the long-term one (‘temporal myopia’),
and, because of this myopia, the long-period survival of the organization may be
jeopardized.
   The temporal myopia trap has also been reported by research in the psychology of
individual decision-making. In this area, the trap is most evident in the tendency of
individuals to prefer small and immediate benefits over more substantial benefits that
will accrue in the future. It is also manifest in the tendency of individuals to avoid small,
immediate losses or sacrifices , preferring greater losses more distant in time. On this
see Vlek and Keren’s (1991) survey of individual assessment of environmental risk.
   Various explanations have been offered of these systematic patterns in individual
assessments and decisions. Bjorkman (1984) believes that the phenomenon of
‘impatience’ is mainly due to the fact that individuals have less knowledge about
(greater ambiguity), and feel less involved by (greater indifference), events that they
believe will happen in a more or less remote future. Another explanation suggest that
these phenomena depend on the subjective value function of individuals, and in
particular on the non-linearity and asymmetry between their assessments of losses and
gains (see on this the ‘prospect theory’ developed by Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). On
the basis of this function, an immediate loss is given a more negative evaluation than the
positive evaluation of an immediate gain to the same amount. Moreover, given the non-
linearity of the subjective value function, losses or gains with the same expected value
are assessed differently. Finally, a number of studies have shown that the presentation of
losses/gains influences the temporal discounting of the consequences of actions in the
sphere of individual intertemporal decision-making.
   Apart from temporal myopia, Levinthal and March (1993) describe further traps and
organizational tendencies, such as, for example, ‘failure myopia’ and the ‘success trap’.
9    Failure myopia is the tendency of organizations to ignore or to underestimate their
lack of success or failures. This form of myopia gives rise to the tendency of
organizations to overestimate their chances of success. A similar phenomenon has been
reported in the psychology of individual probabilistic judgment, otherwise known as the
‘hindsight effect’. This effect induces individuals to underestimate their errors of
probabilistic judgement committed in the past and, consequently, to overestimate their
ability to evaluate situations (Fischhoff, 1975).
   As regards the success trap, the tendency of organizations to focus on their successes
may induce them to persist unduly with procedures and actions that have proved
successful in the past. Consequently, an organization falling into this trap tends to base
its activity on processes of organizational exploitation, to the detriment of research and
innovation. This tendency may also prevent the organization from adapting, wholly or
partly, to changed environmental conditions. The practice of resorting in inappropriate
situations to procedures that have already proved efficient in the past also arises in
individual problem-solving. On this see the studies by Luchins (1942) and Luchins and
Luchins (1950) on the mechanization of thought, and in particular on the so-called
(LQVWHOOXQJ effect.
7KHIOH[LELOLW\RIWHDPGHFLVLRQVDQGDFWLRQV
The competitive advantage of a firm depends, among other things, on its ability to adapt
more rapidly to changed market conditions than its competitors. Technological
innovation concerns the ability of innovative organizations to undertake prompt and
radical change in the principles on which they were previously organized. Some authors
have interpreted phenomena such as the flexibility of economic organizations, the
persistence of differences among firms operating in the same industrial sector, and
technological change, in terms of organizational learning (Dosi and Kaniowsky, 1994;
Levitt and March, 1998; Cohen, 1991).
   The characteristics of learning processes and flexibility in the use of  learned
knowledge play a crucial role in WHDPGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ as well. A team may have to deal
with problems when its members are largely unfamiliar with each other - an example
being aircrews, which have very high turnover in their members. Or a team may be
confronted with problems very different from those it has been trained to handle -
emergencies, for example. In these situations, the members must be able rapidly to
construct new, shared mental models of the situation. The success of this operation also
depends on the team’s ability to free itself from decision and coordination models learnt
during training (Orasanu and Salas, 1993).
   Despite the importance of these research topics, there is relatively little empirical
evidence on the learning mechanisms connected with the flexibility/rigidity of  team
coordination and action. Levinthal and March (1993) have recently published a
theoretical study of the relationship between the characteristics of  learning processes
and such organizational phenomena as, for example, adaptation and inertia, as well as a
number of  specific ‘traps’ and ‘myopias’ to which an organization is susceptible.
   Levinthal and March’s overall thesis is that the same features which enable an
organization to achieve success and to improve its performance may also render it
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myopic, inducing it to fall into traps which may be deleterious to its overall
performance. Some of these organizational myopias and traps - temporal and failure
myopia, and the success trap, for instance - have already been discussed in the sub-
section on ‘mind theory’. Most significant from the point of view of the rigidity of
teamwork is the last of them.
   On the basis of the success trap, an organization that has benefited from particular
actions or procedures is liable to persist unduly in their use. The organization may
therefore be caught up in a vicious circle which damages its overall performance.
According to Levinthal and March, this risk depends on the characteristics of
organizational learning processes, which by their very nature simplify the representation
of experience in order to facilitate learning. For example, successes associated with the
use of a known procedure tend to be given greater ‘weight’ than those associated with
new procedures. This is because the organization tends to prioritize successes that are
apparently more probable, immediate (temporal myopia) and closer (spatial myopia).
Consequently, it may rely excessively on procedures which proved efficacious in the
past, thereby running the risk of becoming obsolete or of  failing to adapt promptly to
changed market conditions. In other words, to use Levinthal and March’s expression,
the organization may strategically anchor itself on the exploitation of known procedures,
to the detriment of the search for new ones (exploration).
   The rigidity of a team’s action on the one hand, and its difficulty in adapting rapidly to
unexpected environmental changes on the other, have been evidenced by a set of
experiments conducted by Egidi and others. These experiments involved the 7DUJHW7KH
7ZR card game and consequently examined action by a team consisting of  a pair of
individuals who had to cooperate in order to achieve a shared goal.
$Q H[SHULPHQWDO SDUDGLJP IRU WKH DQDO\VLV RI WHDP GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ WKH µ777¶
JDPH
TTT (Target The Two) is a card game invented by Cohen and Bacdayan (1994) in order
to study the formation of routine behaviors in organizational settings. However, the
characteristics of the game also make it suitable for study of WHDPGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ. In
fact, the pairs of  individuals who play this game do so in a decision and action context
which displays certain features typical of teamwork: for example, the interdependence
between the actions taken by the pair of players and the need to cooperate in order to
achieve a shared goal.
   This experimental paradigm will be described in detail here, because such description
will provide the basis for presentation and discussion in the next two sections of certain
findings concerning the flexibility of  a team’s action and coordination among its
members. Moreover, the description will highlight the advantages and disadvantages of
the experimental methods and information systems applied to study of WHDP GHFLVLRQ
PDNLQJ.
   Target The Two is a card game played by two persons. There are six cards: the two,
three and four of hearts (respectively 2 ' , 3'  and 4' ) and the two, three and four of
clubs (respectively 2 § , 3§  and 4§ ). The game board on which the six cards are
arranged has six positions, as shown in figure 1.
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Ck
Target
Nk
Up
Down
Down
Ck
Nk
2§ 4§
4§
3§
2§
§
4'
Fig. 1
The cards in the Up and Target positions are always uncovered. Each player can see his
own card (respectively positions Ck and Nk). The cards in positions “Down Nk” and
“Down Nc” are covered.
The aim of the game is to place 2 '  in Target . To do that, every player may exchange
the card in his hand with the other cards on the board, with three restriction.
First, one of the two players may exchange his card with the one in Target only if they
belong to the same suit. This player takes the name of Color Keeper (Ck). Second, the
other player may exchange his card with the one in Target only if  both cards have the
same number. This player is called the Number Keeper (Nk). Third, no one can directly
exchange his card with the card in the hand of his partner.
The game is sequential, i.e. neither player can make two moves simultaneously. In other
words, the pair must attain their goal by carrying out a coordinated sequence of moves.
In the series of experiments here reported, Colorkeeper always begins the game. Finally,
in the initial version of the game, the two players can neither see each other nor
communicate verbally.
To better analyze the sequence of actions performed by players, it is convenient to
attach a different symbol to every different move . Therefore for every player we will
define the following moves:
U  -  exchange his card with the card Up
C  -  exchange his card with the face-down card on the left  of Colorkeeper' s card
N  -  exchange his card with the face-down card on the left  of Numberkeeper' s card
T  -  exchange his card with Target
P  -  pass
Players have to cooperate to reach the goal because is their global efficiency that is
rewarded.
The reward system is based on the number of moves players make to achieve the goal
and on the time that elapses: at the beginning of each hand a given amount of money is
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assigned to each pair of players. Every move has a fixed cost.  Therefore at the end of
each hand one pair is rewarded by the difference between the initial amount and the cost
of the moves they have made; The session consists of a number of (40) runs, and players
have a time limit (forty minutes).  Therefore to maximize their reward, the subjects must
use the fewest moves possible for every hand, and to play the higher possible number of
runs within the forty minutes.
To place 2'  in Target there are fundamentally two different strategies. To discover
them, it is convenient to reason in terms of sub-goaling, i.e. to decompose the final goal
into the intermediate goals to be realized by players. (The reader not interested in
analyzing the structure of sub-goals can skip this analysis and pass to the next section, in
which the two strategies are described without further explanations).
Reasoning ’backwards’ and using the rules of the game, one finds that 2'  can be put
into the Target area only under the following alternative conditions:
1. 3'  or 4'  is in Target position and the player with 2 '  in his hand is the Colorkeeper;
2. 2§ is in Target position and the player with 2 '  in his hand is the Numberkeeper.
2§
2§
'
'
'
'
'
'
3
3
2
2
4
4
Colorkeeper
Colorkeeper
Numberkeeper
Fig. 2
 The problem can therefore be solved 1) if at the beginning of the game  4 ' or 3'  are
in the Target area and Colorkeeper searches and puts in Target the 2'  ; or 2) if 2§  is in
the Target area at the beginning and Numberkeeper searches an puts in Target the 2'  .
Now , continuing our backward reasoning, let us see who can move to reach one of the
three conditions above, i.e. to put one of the cards 4 ' , 3' , 2§  in the Target when one
of the remaining cards, i.e. 3 § , or 4§  is in the Target.
Let start with the case in which  2§   is in Target position.  This condition can be
reached if  Colorkeeper have 2§ in hand and   3§  or 4 §   are in Target. Consider then
the case in which  or 3 §  or 4 §  is in Target position : this can be realized if
Numberkeeper have 3§  or 4§  in hand and   4' ,or 3'   are in Target.
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 We have therefore decomposed the problem into its sub-goals. If we combine the last
relations we obtain the diagram in Figure 3.
2§
2§
4§
4§
3§
3§
'
'
'
'
'
'
3
3
2
2
4
4
Nk
Ck Nk
Nk
Ck
Ck
Ck
Ck
Ck
Fig. 3
The nodes of the graph represent the cards that can be in the Target position of the
game board. The nodes adjacent to a given node indicate the cards that can be placed by
Numberkeeper or by Colorkeeper on the Target to replace the card currently on it. For
example, if 4 §  is in the Target area, the rules allow its exchange with 4 ' , with 3 §  or
with 2 § .
The graph is arranged so that all the horizontal lines represent permissible moves by
the Numberkeeper EXWQRW by the Colorkeeper. Conversely, all the vertical and oblique
lines represent moves that Colorkeeper is permitted to make but Numberkeeper is not.
   On the ground of the sub-goals  graph it is possible to reconstruct the sequences of
cards in the Target during a game. This can be done by following the paths in the graph
which begin with the card that was on the Target at the beginning and finish with the
card on the Target at the end. For example, if the initial card in the Target was 4 §  and
the final card is 2 ' , then  we have the paths as in Figure 4.
The Graph shows that when  3 §  o 4§    are in Target there are two opposite strategies to
realize the goal:
First strategy: Numberkeeper searches and put in the Target the  3 '  or  respectively  the
4' and Colorkeeper searches and puts in Target the 2'.    (We will call this strategy
“442” to emphasize that the sequential order in which the cards are put in the Target is
4§ 4' 2' ).
Second strategy : Colorkeeper searches and puts in Target 2§  and later Numberkeeper
searches and puts in Target  2'   (We will call this strategy “422” to emphasize the
sequential order in which the cards are put in the Target is  4 § 2§ 2' ).
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Summarizing, on the basis of the ‘422’ strategy, Colorkeeper is the leader of the strategy
because he first acts by placing 2§  in Target, and Numberkeeper acts as follower
because looks for 2 '  or retain this card, if he has it in his hand, and then place it in
Target after the Colorkeeper’s action. Conversely, on the basis of the ‘442’ strategy, it is
now Numberkeeper who creates the condition for Colorkeeper to close his hand, i.e.
place 2'  in Target. Numberkeeper is now the action leader, that places a hearts card in
Target, while Colorkeeper takes or looks for 2 ' , or else holds on it until Numberkeeper
has realized the first action.
7KHUROHRIH[SHULHQFHLQVXFFHVV
A experiment conducted by Egidi and Narduzzo (1966) revealed a phenomenon known
as the ‘path-dependence effect; a finding which shows that team action is strongly
influenced by the way in which its members initially coordinate themselves. The
experimental procedure was as follows.
   Under one condition (422), 30 pairs of individuals were shown 15 game hands which
were more easily resolved using the 422 strategy, as opposed to the 442 strategy. Under
a second condition (442), the same number of pairs were shown 15 game hands which
could be more easily resolved using the 442 strategy as opposed to the 442 strategy.
Under both conditions, the first 15 hands ‘trained’ the pair in the use of one hand-
resolution strategy rather than the other (training phase). On completion of the training
phase, 27 identical game hands were presented under the same conditions (control
phase).
   In this phase, the two hand-resolution strategies were equally efficient. For example,
the average number of moves required to resolve the 27 hands were 65, using either the
422 or the 442 strategy. However, although the two strategies were equivalent in terms
of their efficiency, one of them tended to be used more frequently by one group of  pairs
compared with the other, and vice-versa, as shown in fig. 4.
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Fig. 4  (from Egidi and Narduzzo, p. 22)
   This result shows that a team trained to coordinate itself in a particular manner in
order to achieve a goal (e.g. using strategy 422) is liable to use that strategy in
subsequent game hands as well. In other words, the way in which the team initially
coordinates itself with success (e.g. in order to resolve the first hands) guides its future
behavior, inducing its members to coordinate themselves in one way rather than another.
This suggests that team action has low flexibility and tends to anchor itself in
coordination patterns discovered at the outset. To use Levinthal and March’s (1993)
expression, in situations where verbal communication is impeded or prevented,
interaction and coordination among the members of a team tend to be regulated by
strategies that ‘exploit’ procedures that have proved to be efficacious in the past, rather
than by strategies of ‘exploration’ or ‘search’.
   As we shall see, although this strategy brings certain advantages, it may render the
team susceptible to certain traps. As regards its advantages, consider this further result
that emerged from Egidi and Narduzzo’s study.
   The experiment showed that certain pairs (‘routinized pairs’) systematically used one
particular strategy during the control phase (10 pairs out of a total of 60). Other pairs
(‘flexible pairs’) used both game strategies. Although, intuitively, one would conclude
that the flexible pair (e.g. the one resolving the hand in the fewest moves) was also the
most efficient, because it adapted more easily to the changed game conditions, exactly
the reverse was the case. These results therefore demonstrate that the routinization or
standardization of team coordination is the best strategy for dealing with problems that
require a cooperative solution and in which verbal communication is impeded or
prevented.
   The better performance of routinized pairs compared with flexible ones suggest that
routinized coordination has certain advantages. For example, Egidi and Narduzzo
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(1996) stress that routinized coordination simplifies the task addressed by each member
of the team (e.g. each member need only concern himself with checking the conditions
that regulate his own action, thereby reducing both the effort required to monitor the
environment and the memory load). Moreover, the standardization of action
coordination may reduce the amount of ambiguous information that arises at various
stages of the game. Consider, for example, the game configuration depicted in figure 1.
   In this situation, move ‘U’ by Colorkeeper (i.e. Colorkeeper exchanges his card for the
one in Up) is ambiguous for the Numberkeeper of a flexible pair. This move may in fact
indicate that Colorkeeper is using both the 422 procedure (Colorkeeper takes 2 §  to
place it in Target) and the 442 procedure (Colorkeeper yields 4 '  so that Numberkeeper
can place it in Target). However, the move is unambiguous for the Numberkeeper of a
routinized pair. Hence, on the basis of a complex shared mental model - that is, of one
which comprises a wide range of problem-solving strategies - the team may be unable to
resolve the ambiguities of the game (see also Heiner, 1983, for more general theoretical
analysis of the relation between the breadth of the action repertoire available to an
individual and the level of uncertainty and ambiguity in the environment).
   Although the use of routinized procedures gives rise, in certain conditions, to globally
more efficient team performances, there are nevertheless situations in which the use of
such procedures may be deleterious to collective performance. For example, there are
configurations in the TTT game which, if  addressed using a routinized procedure, trap
the team in a ‘dead-end’ situation; that is, one which requires ‘detours’. In other words,
in a situation of this kind, the team can still persist with the routinized procedure, but its
performance will be inefficient. For example, the strategy requires a large number of
moves to be made, or moves which cancel others made previously. In these
configurations, known as ‘trap hands’, it is therefore advisable to use the alternative
procedure to the one learnt during training.
7KHULJLGLW\RIWHDPDFWLRQ
   The rigidity of teamwork, and the negative outcomes that may derive from it, have
been studied by the authors of this paper in an experiment which verified how a team
trained in the use of one particular strategy reacts when confronted by a trap hand.
   The experimental procedure used in this study was that same as that described above.
Twenty-seven pairs, with 15 hands each, played the game under the two training
conditions (422 vs. 442). During the control phase, after the players were given neutral
hands (i.e. ones that they could play with equal efficiency using either the 422 or the 442
strategy), and hands designed to control for the presence of non-cooperative
coordination (see the next section), four trap hands were unexpectedly dealt. By way of
illustration, consider the two hands depicted in figure 5a and 5b.
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Fig. 5a (hand 26)
Fig.  5b (Hand n. 27)
Figure 5a shows the 26th game hand, which is a potential trap for pairs which tend to
rely on strategy 422. On the basis of this strategy, Colorkeeper sets up the condition for
Numberkeeper to close his hand, i.e. to place 2 '  in Target. For this purpose,
Colorkeeper must place 2§  in Target. Given that in this hand 2 §  is visible in the Up
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position, according to the 422 strategy Colorkeeper must take 2 § , and Numberkeeper
must search for 2'  or keep hold of  this card if he already has it.
   However, the use of  the 422 strategy in these circumstances is not efficient. In fact, if
Colorkeeper takes 2§  and Numberkeeper holds 2' , the pair finds itself in a dead end,
i.e. in an LPSDVVH, because Colorkeeper cannot place 2 §  in Target and, consequently,
Numberkeeper cannot close his hand. Nonetheless, the use of the 422 strategy does
eventually enable the pair to resolve the hand with the customary coordination. But to
do so they must make extra moves, and especially moves which cancel out moves made
previously. For example, Numberkeeper may temporarily ‘discard’ 2 '  in order to place
4§  in Target. This latter move enables Colorkeeper to place 2§  in Target and,
consequently, Numberkeeper to close the hand after retaking 2' .
   The results show that 39% of the pairs (9 out of 23) which responded well to the 422
training fell into the trap. That is, they spontaneously put themselves in a dead-end
situation by making the ‘U’ and ‘P’ moves (i.e. respectively Colorkeeper changed his
card with the one in Up, and Numberkeeper ‘passed’ and kept his card).
   Figure 5b shows the 27th hand, which this time is a trap hand for the pair which tends
use the 442 strategy. On the basis of this strategy, Numberkeeper enables Colorkeeper to
close the hand, i.e. place 2 '  in the Target. For this purpose, Numberkeeper must place a
hearts card in Target, and Colorkeeper must take or look for 2 ' , or keep hold of it.
Given that in this hand 2'  is held by Colorkeeper, on the basis of the 244 strategy
Colorkeeper must keep this card while waiting for Numberkeeper to place a hearts card
in Target.
   But the use of this strategy in this situation is not efficient. In fact, if Colorkeeper
holds on to 2 ' , Numberkeeper will never be able to place a hearts card in Target.
Consequently the pair will be unable to close the hand. Of course, it is possible to
escape the LPSDVVH and close the hand with the 442 strategy by means of moves which
cancel ones made previously. For example, Colorkeeper may temporarily ‘discard’ 2 '
and place 3§  in Target. By doing so, he enables Numberkeeper to place a hearts card in
Target (3 ' , for example), and Colorkeeper can consequently close the hand after
retaking 2' .
   The results show that 48% of the pairs (10 out of 21) who had responded well to the
442 training fell into the trap. That is, they spontaneously put themselves in a dead-end
situation because Colorkeeper has made the ‘P’ or ‘Pass’ move.
   The results obtained by Egidi and colleagues show that, under certain conditions (e.g.
when verbal communication is obstructed), team action tends to rely on coordination
models learned during the initial phases of training. This strategy, characterized by the
‘exploitation’ of problem-solving procedures used successfully in the past, is sub-
optimal. That is, in certain conditions it may prove to be the more efficient strategy, but
in others it may induce the team spontaneously to place itself in situations which
compromise overall performance.
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7HDPFRRUGLQDWLRQ
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of WHDPGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ is coordination among the
actions and decisions of the team-members. Although the skills displayed by the
members of efficient teams have not yet been adequately studied, it is likely that some
of them are necessary for achievement of a high level of coordination. For example, if
one team-member is to coordinate his actions with those of his colleagues, it is probably
important for him to know how to formulate accurate expectations about the needs,
information, priorities, and sequence of actions, of his partners.
   That coordination is functional to development of accurate expectations is a
hypothesis also sustained by the theory of shared mental models (Orasanu and Salas,
1993). According to this theory, coordination among the members of a team depends on
the precision of the match between the shared mental model and the situation at hand. It
is on the basis of this shared model that each team-member is able to formulate accurate
expectations about the needs, priorities and sequence of actions of  his colleagues.
   Unfortunately, there has been little attempt to test this hypothesis empirically (see
Adelman et al., 1986; Brehmer, 1972), and the few studies conducted have been
criticized on various grounds (for example, the members of the team had received
insufficient training for them to develop shared mental models). Nevertheless, there is
indirect evidence to suggest that coordination among the decisions and actions of the
members of a team is an important factor in its efficiency.
)DPLOLDULW\DPRQJWKHPHPEHUVRIDWHDP
   Studies on familiarity among the members of a team provide indirect evidence about
the effects of the level of coordination among the members on their collective
performance. One can plausibly argue, in fact, that the greater the familiarity among the
members of a team, the higher will be their level of  coordination (for example, because
they have had numerous opportunities to communicate and to learn their respective
needs, priorities, etc.).
   Note that familiarity is one of the various attributes relative to the composition of a
team or, more in general, of a group (Guzzo and Dickson, 1996). The composition of a
group, in fact, may vary according to the degree of homogeneity or cohesion among its
members, to the presence or otherwise of a leader, etc.
   The results of these studies show that familiarity among the members of a team is
positively correlated with the effectiveness of their performance. For example, a study
by Foushee, Lauber, Baetge and Acomb (1986 cit. in Orasanu and Salas, 1993, p. 333)
demonstrates that familiarity among the members of flight crew enables them to
maintain a satisfactory level of performance even when they are tired or overworked.
Foushee et al. argue that this finding shows that greater familiarity among the members
of a crew enables them to develop interaction patterns which facilitate their coordination
and decision-making. Athens (1982) stresses that frequent communication among
military commanders fosters the development of shared mental models of the situation.
Similarity among the mental models used by the various commanders in turn enhances
communication, and consequently improves coordination among their decisions and
actions. Note that the importance of familiarity among team-members has been
recognized by the United States Army, which gives priority to the amount of flying time
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spent together when it forms flight crews (battle-rostering) (see Guzzo and Dickson,
1996, p. 318).
   However, familiarity among the members of a team is neither a sufficient nor a
permanent condition for an improvement in collective performance. Katz (1982), for
example, has argued that the longevity of  group members is a factor which may affect
the quality of their performance. Moreover, Leedom and Simon (1995, cit. in Guzzo and
Dickson, 1996) stress that the use of a battle-rostering strategy when forming flight
crews may, in the long run, give rise to their excessive and unjustified faith in their
abilities as a team. Leedom and Simon also show that the performance of a team which
receives training based on the standardization of  its members’ behavior is better than
that of a team which does not receive such training and whose members are familiar
with each other.
7KHFRRUGLQDWLRQRIGHFLVLRQVDQGDFWLRQV
   A number of studies have more directly verified the influence of the level of (implicit
or explicit) team coordination on  collective performance. Consider, for instance, the
analysis conducted by Kanki, Lozito and Foushee (1989, cit. in Orasanu and Salas,
1993) of the data gathered by Foushee et al. (1986).
   Kanki and colleagues show that communication among the members of a crew differs
according to their degree of familiarity. More familiar crews develop more
homogeneous communication, while the communication of less familiar crews is less
predictable and more uneven. Kanki et al. suggest that flying together encourages the
development of a standardized and conventional language, and it enhances
understanding of reciprocal expectations so that implicit coordination patterns can be
formed (e.g. in the absence of overt communication).
   The influence of coordination on the quality of performance has also emerged from a
comparative study of flight difficulties in commercial and military aviation carried out
by Prince and Salas (1993). According to these authors,  the difficulties encountered by
the two types of aircrew stem from numerous causes, and they concern, for example,
information exchange in the cockpit, the allocation and establishment of  task priorities,
and relationships among the members of the team. The two latter types of difficulty
highlight the role of coordination among the crew members in determining their
performance.
   However, the better performance achieved by teams whose members are familiar with
each other, or who display good levels of coordination, may derive from the formation
by each member of accurate expectations concerning the needs, priorities and actions
sequence of his colleagues. The influence of  accurate expectations on team
performance has been stressed by the theory of shared mental models (Orasanu and
Salas, 1993), and it has been demonstrated by a number of studies.
   Cream (1974 cit. in Cannon-Bowers, Salas and Converse, 1993), for example, has
shown that the formulation of accurate expectations concerning the functional
responsibilities of one’s colleagues is a major factor in efficient team performance.
Oser, Prince and Morgan (1990 cit. in Cannon-Bowers, Salas and Converse, 1993) have
reported that the providing of information to the other members of the team before it is
explicitly  requested  is a distinctive feature of efficient military control and command.
A similar finding has reported by Lanzetta and Roby (1960) on the basis of a laboratory
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experiment in which teams had to solve a number of problems. The best performance
was achieved by groups whose members voluntarily supplied information when the
situation required it. According to Lanzetta and Roby, this result suggests that the
members of efficient teams develop shared models of their colleagues’ responsibilities
and needs. Finally, Hemphill and Rush (1952 cit. in Cannon-Bowers, Salas and
Converse, 1993) contend that the sharing of knowledge relative to the functions of the
members of a team, and to their responsibilities, enhances collective performance.
   Studies on team familiarity and coordination, as well as the theory of shared mental
models, suggest that coordination is a function of  the accuracy of the expectations of
each team-member concerning the actions, decisions and priorities of his colleagues. On
this view, coordination among team-members requires them to develop a rather complex
shared mental model. This model must include both knowledge relative to the functions,
roles and responsibilities to one’s team-mates, and a set of expectations about the
dynamics of their actions and decisions. Moreover, coordination among the members of
efficient teams must be cooperative or collaborative. In other words, by means of
cooperative coordination not only is each member of a team aware of the needs and
functions of his colleagues, but he works to create conditions conducive for both his
actions and those of his colleagues.
   Although there is no direct data on the characteristics of the shared mental models of
efficient teams, a number of studies have revealed the existence of cooperative or
collaborative coordination among the members of efficient teams. This type of
coordination has been reported by, for example, Oser et al. (1990), who show that the
members of the team supplied information to their colleagues before it was explicitly
requested. And a similar phenomenon has been  identified by a laboratory experiment
conducted by Lanzetta and Roby (1960).
   However, coordination among the actions of the members of a team may in theory
come about in the absence of collaborative behavior. In non-cooperative coordination,
for example, each member is principally concerned to control the conditions for his
action and to perform this action correctly. In this case, although the action of each
team-member depends on that undertaken by the others in order to achieve the shared
goal, it is psychologically independent of their actions and needs.
   Before presenting an experiment designed to verify the existence under laboratory
conditions of cooperative or non-cooperative coordination, it is necessary to refer once
again to the discussion conducted in the previous section.
   Research by Egidi and Narduzzo (1996) has shown that teams consisting of pairs of
individuals may ‘routinize’ their action. In other words, teams which have been trained
to employ a specific strategy in order to complete the TTT game tend to persist with the
same form of action coordination in subsequent, though often inappropriate, game
situations.
   Although routinized teams may be induced to employ a given coordination strategy in
inappropriate situations, routinized team coordination may offer advantages with respect
to flexible team coordination - that is, coordination which changes according to the
situation. Egidi and Narduzzo (1996) stress that routinized coordination simplifies the
task addressed by each member of the team (for example, each player need only concern
himself with controlling the conditions regulating his own action, thereby reducing both
environment-monitoring effort and memory load). Moreover, the standardization of
action coordination may reduce the amount of ambiguous information arising at various
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stages of the game. As Egidi and Narduzzo’s research shows, in certain situations a
particular action may assume different ‘meanings’ and, unlike a simplified mental
model, a complex mental model, i.e. one which comprises a broad range of problem-
solving strategies, may be unable to resolve this ambiguity (see also Heiner, 1983, for
more general theoretical analysis of the relation between the extent of the action
repertoire available to an individual and the level of uncertainty and ambiguity in the
environment).
   In order to verify the existence of cooperative or non-cooperative coordination in
laboratory situations where teams are engaged in achieving a shared goal, Egidi and
Bonini (forthcoming) conducted the experiment described below.
   Egidi and Bonini used the same experimental design as employed by Egidi and
Narduzzo (1966). In other words, the pairs of students who took part in the experiment
were divided at random into two groups receiving different forms of training (15 hands):
422 training vs. 442 training. There then followed a control phase (27 hands) in which
the same hands were dealt to pairs from both training groups.
   Although 42 hands overall were used in the two studies, the types of hand used were
different, and they were dealt in a different order. In the experiment to study the
modalities of team coordination, six hands were used (from the 20th to the 25th) which
had a specific feature in common. For simplicity’s sake, we present only the results
relative to the 23rd and 24th hands (see fig. 6a, 6b).
Fig. 6a  (Hand n. 23)
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Fig. 6b (Hand n.24)
 As said in the previous section, a pair of players trained to close the hand using the 442
strategy must coordinate its search and execution activities so that Colorkeeper is able to
achieve the goal, i.e. place 2'  in Target. For this purpose, Numberkeeper must first
place a hearts card in Target. In hand 23, Colorkeeper does not have 2 '  in his hand, nor
is this card visible on the game board. However, he does have 4 ' , which his partner
needs to achieve the goal.
   In this situation, the 442 closure strategy can be implemented via two forms of
coordination: cooperative or non-cooperative.
   In the former case, Colorkeeper passes 4'  to his partner by placing it in UP. Now
Colorkeeper need only find card 2'  and follow the conventional 244 closure strategy. In
the latter case, Colorkeeper searches for his card. Since 2'  is not visible, Colorkeeper is
forced to conceal the card that his partner needs. Consequently, in this case, the hand
tends to be closed on the basis of the 442 strategy, but there is no cooperation between
the team-members as they search for the cards they need. With non-cooperative
coordination, each player searches for the card he needs, ’blindly’ following the closure
strategy in which he has been trained  and without helping the partner in his search.
    Considering in particular pairs who responded well to 442 training (21 pairs out of
27), non-cooperative coordination is evidenced in hand 23 by the separate search by
each player for the card that he needs. In other words, the first two moves consist of a
card search (either in position C or in position N). By contrast, cooperative coordination
is evidenced by one of the two move sequences UUCTNPT or UUNTT (where UCNT
indicates the exchange of the card held by the player for the card in positions Up, C, N
and Target. Move P indicates ‘Pass’, i.e. the player keeps his card).
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   The results show that only 2 pairs out of 21 (10%) closed their hand by following one
of the two cooperative coordination sequences, while 17 pairs out of 21 (1%) conducted
an independent card search in their first two moves. This finding demonstrates the
existence of non-cooperative coordination in teams consisting of two individuals
seeking to achieve a shared goal by undertaking a series of interdependent actions.
Consider, finally, the 24th hand.
   As illustrated in the previous section, a pair trained to close the hand by means of the
422 strategy must coordinate its search and execution activities so that Numberkeeper
can achieve the shared goal by putting 2 '  in Target. Consequently, Colorkeeper must
first place 2§  in Target. In the 24th hand, Colorkeeper does not hold 2 § , nor is it visible
on the game board; it  is in Numberkeeper’s hand.
   In this situation the 422 closure strategy can be employed, as before, by using either a
cooperative or non-cooperative form of coordination.
   In the former case, Colorkeeper looks for 2§ , and Numberkeeper passes it to him by
placing it in Up. Now Numberkeeper need only find card 2'  and follow the
conventional 422 closure strategy. In the latter case, both players search for the card they
need. Of course, given that 2'  is not visible, Numberkeeper is forced to conceal the
card that his partner needs. Consequently, in this case too, the hand tends to be closed
on the basis of the 422 strategy, but there is no cooperation between the team-members
as they search for the cards they need. With non-cooperative coordination, each player
searches for the card he needs, ’blindly’ following the closure strategy in which he has
been trained  and without helping the partner in his search.
    Considering pairs who responded well to 422 training (23 pairs out of 27), non-
cooperative coordination is evidenced in hand 24 by the separate search by each player
for the card that he needs. In other words, the first two moves consist of a card search
(either in position C or in position N). By contrast, cooperative coordination is
evidenced by one of three move sequences CUUNTT, CUUCTNPT, or NUUUTT.
      The results show that 6 pairs out of 23 (26%) closed the hand by following one of
the three cooperative coordination sequences, while 16 pairs out of 23 (70%) conducted
an independent card search in their first two moves. Here too, therefore, the result shows
that teams may coordinate themselves in non-cooperative manner in order to achieve
shared goals.
   The results relative to the other four hands designed to verify the type of coordination
adopted by the team show that the percentage of pairs using a non-cooperative
coordination strategy varies considerably according to the hand concerned (from 9% to
81%). This finding makes the phenomenon of non-cooperative coordination even more
interesting, because it suggests that such coordination is contextual in nature, that is, it
depends on the informational characteristics of the situation addressed by the team. If, as
one can deduce from the results obtained in this sector of research, cooperative
coordination is positively correlated with the efficiency of the team’s action, then future
research should seek to give further specification to the conditions which encourage this
latter form of coordination.
25
3DWKGHSHQGHQF\LQHGLWLQJPHQWDOPRGHOV
Target the Two admits two alternative sub optimal strategies for playing all the
(second level) games. As we have seen, by exposing a group of players to a set of
preliminary runs characterized by starting configurations all easily solved by using the
same strategy, they have been "induced" to discover  this solution more easily than its
alternative, to memorize it more deeply, and to routinize their behaviors accordingly.
An question arising from Egidi and Narduzzo experiment on path dependency, is
whether the path dependency is a  process generated by the interaction of two players or,
on the contrary, it emerges from a distortion in individual activity of  mental
exploration.
To clarify this point, Egidi prepared an experiment in which every player played both
the roles of  Numberkeeper and Colorkeeper. The sequences of  starting boards were the
same as in Egidi-Narduzzo experiment, to allow a full comparison between
experiments.
The results of the experiment shows the rise of persistent differentiation in the players’
behavior  (fig 8). The group of players exposed to a set of configurations which led
more easily to one strategy continued to use it more frequently in the second part of the
tournament, and symmetric behavior arose in the other group. Moreover, in both groups
emerged a sub set of players with strongly routinized behaviors, i.e. groups of player
which, after the training phase, adopted one strategy once and for all, and insisted on
using it even when hands could not be efficiently played with the strategy adopted.
We have therefore the experimental evidence that also in the context of individual
action, players may be routinized, and trapped into a sub optimal strategy insofar as they
used the same set of rules of action even when they were inefficient, being unable  or
unwilling to  find alternative rules of action.
Fig. 7
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In consequence we can attribute the origin of the path dependency to the focusing
activity of players, in a context of uncertainty and bounded rationality. Players make
systematic errors when they explore the alternative actions available, EHFDXVH a limited
exploration of the alternatives may lead to a wrong conclusions. The interaction
between actors simply emphasizes the path dependency that already exists as individual
mental process.
)LQDOUHPDUNV
Although in recent years various approaches to WHDP GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ have been
proposed, and although technological advances have made it possible to circumvent
some of the methodological difficulties that arise in this sector of research, experimental
study of the cognitive mechanisms involved in the team coordination, and, in general, of
those relative to team performance and its adaptability, is still only in its initial stages.
   Nevertheless, it is possible to evidence a number of results and to indicate problems
that should be addressed to by future research. In what follows, we limit ourselves to
comments relating the TTT experiments with the more general problems raised in the
literature.
At the beginning of this paper we suggested a relation between routinization as
organizative process and routinization as individual mental process in order to check the
validity the “shared mental model” approach.   The results of the experiments with TTT
confirm this approach: we recall to the reader, in fact, that  in Egidi Narduzzo
experiment, after the tournament subjects were required to verbalize their ideas about
the strategies  they adopted. Their answers permitted comparison between the micro
behaviors and the "mental models" that emerged from verbalization. Players explained
their strategies in terms of the triggering of actions induced by sets of condition of the
game, and showed clear –even limited- expectations about the partner’s strategies,
coherently with “shared mental model” idea.
The individual mental models are drastically simplified in routinized pairs of players,
because they have to keep into account only a simplified set of game conditions to
which react. The same property holds for the relation between “active” and “passive”
cooperation between partners: as we have seen, in certain conditions, “passive” (non-
cooperative) cooperation strategies are associated with more efficient teams. Indeed, the
research with TTT we have discussed demonstrates that in conditions in which there are
tight temporal constraints on the team’s decision-making and action, as well as
impediments on verbal communication, teams which systematically use only one
problem-solving procedure may be more efficient. And these are teams which also tend
to use a non-cooperative coordination strategy.
   Empirical data on the process whereby a shared model is developed by a team are
meager in literature. It seems likely, however, that learning mechanisms change with the
amount of  material to be learnt. Indeed it may be the case that in the initial stages of
learning the members of a team concentrate on the random exploration of their mental
representation of the situation. They then abandon this search and rely on already
acquired coordination strategies. The experimental results obtained by Bonini and Egidi
tend to confirm this model of the development of team learning.
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    Finally, not less important than the two problems just discussed, is the question of
the origin of path dependency which gives rise to cognitive traps. Even though the teams
and organizations may fall in cognitive traps as a consequence of the cumulated effects
of the errors of the components of the team  (and therefore as consequence of SURSHUWLHV
RI WKHWHDP - as the distribution of responsibilities, information transmission, etc.), the
origin of the process is in the features of individual thinking. This  conclusion is limited
to the context of the experiments, i.e. of team in which the individuals are not allowed
to communicate verbally, but it is statistically robust: exactly as in the experiment with
pairs of players, also in the last experiment with individuals playing both roles of
Numberkeeper and Colorkeeper, many players use one strategy only and a large part of
them “prefer” to use the strategy that they have learnt at the beginning, during the
training phase. The path dependency seems therefore well explained   by the limited
ability of every players to consider all available chances: players explore in a very
limited way the set of opportunities, and therefore they HGLW in a very incomplete way the
problem to be solved; as a consequence, their individual mental models are focalized on
one strategy only, the one that is more familiar.
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